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I. INTRODUCTION
While debate rages throughout Ohio and elsewhere regarding adopting of
children by same-sex parents, what cannot be debated is the need for adoptive
homes.2 Almost 500,000 children in the United States are in foster care awaiting
'Susan Becker is an associate professor of law at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University. She served as legal counsel for the amicus curiae in the In re Jane
Doe litigation. Professor Becker wishes to thank her friends and colleagues Barbara Tyler and
Veronica Dougherty for their comments on various drafts of this article but retains full
responsibility for any miscues in this piece.
2See generally ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT,
FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999); see also Symposium, Adopting More
Kids: Barriers and Solutions, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 73-151 (1999).
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permanent homes.' In Ohio's Cuyahoga County alone, 2,700 children are in foster
care awaiting permanent placements.4 In response to this crushing need, the federal
government has enacted laws providing financial incentives to states that streamline
their adoption procedures and place these children in permanent homes.'
In addition to the need for homes for children without any legally recognized
parent, the need for a child who already has one legal parent to be adopted by the
parent's gay or lesbian partner who is already serving as a de facto parent is very
important to the child's emotional stability and material well being. This type of
adoption, frequently referred to as a "second-parent" adoption,' is the focal point of
this article. However, the matters discussed herein also apply directly and by
analogy to situations where gay and lesbian couples and heterosexual unmarried
couples desire to jointly adopt a child who is a ward of the state.
There are many ways in which lesbian and gay couples7 seek to become parents
and form legally recognized families through adoption. Typical scenarios include a
gay or lesbian couple without biological children seeking to jointly adopt a child
through a county child welfare department or a private adoption. One partner may
have a biological child from a previous heterosexual relationship, and both the
biological parent and their partner want the partner to adopt that child. One partner
may have adopted a child in the United States or in a foreign country, and the other
partner now wants to also adopt the child. A gay couple may have involved a
surrogate mother to have a child, and the non-biological father wishes to adopt the
child. A lesbian couple may decide to bring a child into this world together, with
one becoming the biological mother either through a known or anonymous sperm
donor, and the non-biological mother may seek to adopt that child. Any of these
situations may, of course, involve more than one child
3H.R. REP. No. 105-89, at 7-8 (1997) (reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2740).
4Christopher Quinn, Wanted: Parents; County Adoption Crisis, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 30,
1999, at Al.
5See, e.g., Adoption and Safe Family Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89 (providing financial
incentives for states that increase the number of foster children for whom permanent families
are established through adoption).
6Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial
Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REv. 1019
(1999); Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parentingfor Same-Sex Couples in a Brave
New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1 (1999); Maxwell S. Peltz, Second-Parent Adoption: Overcoming
Barriers to Lesbian Family Rights, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & LAW 175 (1995).
7The term "gay couple" as used herein means two males who identify themselves as
homosexual and who are in a committed relationship; a "lesbian couple" means two women in
this type of relationship. These definitions also allow for the possibility that one or both
partners in a couple may identify as bisexual, but each has made a commitment to a
relationship that would be traditionally defined as homosexual.
8Vast literature exists on the legal and social ramifications of homosexuals adopting and
raising children. Although the author is familiar with these excellent sources of data and
analysis, they are not extensively cited throughout this piece because the focus here is not on
the appropriateness of such adoptions generally, but rather the specific situation presented by
relevant Ohio law. See generally, authorities cited in footnote 6, supra and footnote 104,
[Vol. 48: 101
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Each scenario provides a variety of financial, social, medical and other
challenges for the partners and their children. But perhaps the biggest challenge is
obtaining legal recognition - and thus the numerous safeguards and benefits that
accompany legally recognized relationships - for this relatively new family
paradigm.9
At one end of the spectrum are states that prohibit homosexuals from adopting
either individually,'0 or by denying petitions in what are generically categorized as
"second-parent adoptions."" But a greater number of states have recognized the
validity of cementing the relationship between the child and her de facto parent by
allowing the non-biological or non-legally recognized parent to adopt the child. 2
infra. See also, JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAM\iE OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES
IN THE POSTMODERN AGE (1996).
9Issues of family law, including adoption, have traditionally been within the sovereign
powers of the states. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (subject of domestic
relations belongs to the laws of the states except in rare occasions when family law comes into
conflict with federal statute); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890). Therefore, attempts to invoke
federal courts and law into family law matters is seldom successful unless a colorable federal
constitutional issue is presented. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). The
Troxel Court, for example, struck down Washington statutes that allowed any person to
petition the court for visitation rights at any time, and empowered courts to order visitation
when it "may serve the best interest of the child." WASH. REv. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
Although the Court splintered in its reasoning for striking down the statute, at least four
justices agreed that such legislation violated the parents' constitutional right to custody, care
and control of their children, a right which the Court characterized as "perhaps the oldest of
the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
10As of this writing, Florida and Mississippi are the only states that have statutes explicitly
prohibiting adoptions by homosexuals. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(d)(3) (West 1999);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(2) (2000). See also Cheryl Wetzstein, Mississippi Bans Adoptions
by Homosexuals; Law Spurred by Vermont Gay Benefits, WASH. TIMES, May 5, 2000, at Al.
Utah's Board of Trustees of the Division of Child and Family Services approved two policies
in March, 2000, which prohibit "cohabiting" adults - defined in a manner that includes gay
and lesbian couples - from being foster parents and from adopting children. See Hilary
Groutage, State Board Adopts Policies on Adoption, Foster Care, SALT LAKE TRm., Apr. 1,
2000, at D4. The policies reflect changes in Utah law that became effective May 1, 2000 that
prohibit unmarried persons from adopting children. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-9(3)(a-b)
(2000). A New Hampshire law prohibiting foster parenting and adoption by gays and lesbians
was repealed effective July 2, 1999. Norma Love, New Hampshire Repeals 12-Year Ban on
Child Adoptions by Homosexuals, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, May 4, 1999, at 4B.
"See, e.g., In re Adoption of Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1998); Georgia G. v. Terry
M., 516 N.W.2d 678, 684 (Wisc. 1994). The Connecticut court's decision was trumped by
state legislation allowing homosexuals and other unmarried persons to adopt their partner's
children. Conn. H.B. 5830 was signed by the governor June 1, 2000. It allows a person who
shares parental responsibilities for the child with the child's parent to adopt or join the
adoption of a child even though the two adults are not married, provided that the probate court
finds the proposed adoption in the best interest of the child.
12See, e.g., M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M. and
D.M. to Adopt Olivia M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Il. 1995); In re Adoption of Two Children by
H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass.
1993); In re Jacob, 600 N.E.2d 397, 405-06 (N.Y. 1995): Adoptions of B.L.V.D. & E.L.V.B.,
628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993). As revised in 1995, Vermont's adoption statute recognized
20001
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Ohio law regarding second-parent adoptions remains unsettled. In In re Adoption
of Jane Doe, the Summit County Court of Appeals, Ninth Appellate District,
interpreted Ohio law as disallowing second-parent adoption." But the Supreme
Court of Ohio's refusal to review the case means that the decision is only binding in
the Ninth District, with other districts being free to accept or reject the rationale of
the Ninth District opinion. 4
The petitioners in In re Jane Doe are a lesbian couple who decided to become
parents. One woman is the biological mother, and her partner is a de facto and
psychological parent to the child. Despite the non-biological mother's loving and
dutiful acceptance and execution of her parental role from the day of the child's
conception to the present, she remains a total stranger to the child in the eyes of the
law. The decision in In re Jane Doe ensures that the stranger relationship will
continue. As more fully explained below, the rationale employed by the Ninth
District's decision to deny the adoption arguably extends to every case where a gay,
lesbian, or even unmarried heterosexual partner of a parent seeks to adopt the
partner's child.
Section II of this article provides an overview of Ohio adoption law. Section HI
presents the case of In re Jane Doe, starting with the decision of the lesbian couple to
jointly bring a child into this world, and continuing with the efforts of both mothers
to obtain legal recognition for the de facto parent's status through adoption, and the
legal strategies employed by the mothers' attorneys, also addressed are the court-
appointed Guardian Ad Litem (GAL), the social science data supplied by the amicus
curiae to help the court reach a fully informed decision, and the Ohio courts'
rejection of the possibility of second-parent adoptions in Ohio. Section IV offers a
critique of the courts' analysis of the case. Section V is a brief conclusion.
II. OHIO ADOPTION LAW
The legal principles governing adoption in Ohio are drafted and adopted by the
Ohio General Assembly and signed into law by the governor. Ohio adoption law is
primarily codified in Chapter 3701 of the Ohio Revised Code. Since no statutory
scheme can cover the myriad issues arising in the adoption context, significant case
law provides guidance for the interpretation and application of Chapter 3701.
the right to second-parent adoptions. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A § 1-102 (1999). At least one
court in Indiana has allowed second parent adoptions. See Scott Olson, N.J Ruling on
Adoption by Gays Not Likely to be Duplicated by Indiana, Experts Say, IND. LAW., Jan. 7,
1998, at 11.
13In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
4Article IV, § 3 of the Ohio constitution establishes the appellate court system. Article IV,
§ 3(B)(4) provides that when an appeals court announces a decision that conflicts with a
decision rendered by any of the 11 other courts of appeal in the state, "the judges shall certify
the record of the case to the supreme court for review and final determination." Therefore, it
is the Supreme Court of Ohio, rather than appeals court, that establishes state-wide precedent.
Ohio's courts of appeal are structured pursuant to OHIo REv. CODE. ANN. § 2501 (West 2000).
This statute creates twelve appellate districts, with three consisting of only one county each
(Cuyahoga, Franklin, and Hamilton) and the largest consisting of 17 counties. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2501.01 (West 2000).
[Vol. 48: 101
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In Ohio, only an agency licensed by the state or an attorney may arrange an
adoption.'" Persons who may be adopted include a minor, a permanently disabled or
mentally retarded adult, or an adult who, as a minor, established a child-foster parent
or child-stepchild relationship with the person seeking to adopt. 6 Persons who may
adopt include "a husband and wife together, at least one of whom is an adult"'7 and
"an unmarried adult."'" A married adult can adopt without the other spouse joining
the petition in several circumstances, including where "the other spouse is a parent of
the person to be adopted and supports the adoption."' 9
The person seeking to adopt must file a petition for adoption" with the probate
division of the court of common pleas.2' A home study is usually conducted by an
"assessor" - traditionally a professional counselor, social worker or psychologist' -
"for the purpose of ascertaining whether a person seeking to adopt a minor is suitable
to adopt."23  One or more hearings are held to determine whether the legal
prerequisites are met and whether the facts support a finding that the proposed
adoption is in the best interest of the person to be adopted. 4
The effects of a final adoption decree include creating "the relationship of parent
and child between petitioner and the adopted person, as if the adopted person were a
'
5OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.011 (West 2000).
60mo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.02 (West 2000).
17 Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(A) (West 2000).
'0OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(B) (West 2000).
190Hio REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.03(D)(1) (West 2000). Consent to adoptions must be
obtained from a mother, father, or putative father whose rights will be terminated by the
adoption, by any agency that has permanent custody of the child, and the minor being adopted
if more than 12 years of age. OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3107.06, 3107.081 (West 2000).
20OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.031 (West 2000). Procedures in probate courts are
governed by Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure "except to the extent that by their nature they
would be clearly inapplicable," OHIo R. Civ. P. 73(A), and local rules of court promulgated
under the authority delegated by the Supreme Court of Ohio in Oluo R. Civ. P. 83(B). Forms
used in probate court are prescribed by Rule 51 of the Rules of Superintendence for the Courts
of Ohio enacted by the Supreme Court of Ohio. See Otuo R. Civ. P. 73(H); SuP. R. 51.
However, the rules allow "an original pleading" to be prepared for filing which modifies the
information required in the applicable form as the particular case or proceeding requires. Sup.
R. 51 (C)(2).
21The petition for adoption can be filed in the county where the person to be adopted was
born, or where, "at the time of filing the petition, the petitioner or the person to be adopted or
parent of the person to be adopted resides." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.04(A) (West 2000).
The probate courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over adoption proceedings. State,
ex rel. Portage Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6 (Ohio 1974).
22 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.012 (West 2000).
23Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.031 (West 2000). The person conducting the home study,
known as an "assessor" under Ohio law, must have specific credentials and training as set
forth in OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.012 (West 2000).
24Owo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.14 (West 2000). See also OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3107.011 (West 2000).
2000)
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legitimate blood descendant of the petitioner, for all purposes including inheritance
and applicability of statutes, documents, and instruments.... "25 The final decree also
makes the adopted person "a stranger to the adopted person's former relatives for all
purposes." 6 As discussed later in this article,2" this statutory severance from former
relatives formed the basis of the trial and appellate court decisions in In Re Adoption
of Jane Doe to bar gay men and lesbians from adopting their partners' children
unless the biological parent/partners' rights are terminated.
In general, Ohio courts have interpreted the adoption statutes liberally to ensure
that the best interests of the child are met. In fact, Ohio's highest court has
acknowledged that "strict construction does not require that we interpret [adoption]
statutes in such a manner that would mandate an unjust or unreasonable result."2 " In
one case, the Supreme Court of Ohio overrode the statutory mandate requiring
agency approval of a proposed adoption, ruling that the probate court is empowered
to disregard that statutory requirement when it is in the best interest of the child to do
so.
29
In terms of adoption by gay men or lesbians, perhaps the most important thing is
what the statute and case law do not hold: there is no statutory nor is there a common
law prohibition against homosexuals or unmarried individuals adopting in Ohio. The
possibility that adoptions by homosexuals would be per se prohibited by courts
based on public policy or upon a "best interest of the child" analysis was soundly
rejected by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the case of In re Charles B. 30
The petitioner in Charles B was a gay man who cohabitated with his male
partner. Mr. B had been a foster parent of a young boy for several years. The
probate court held that the adoption was in the child's best interest, but the appeals
court reversed, finding that, as a matter of law, homosexuals are not allowed to
adopt. "The court of appeals stated, in effect, that it could never be in a child's best
interest to be adopted by a person such as Mr. B."'"
The Supreme Court of Ohio reinstated the adoption, finding that the proposed
adoption by Mr. B satisfied the threshold statutory requirements of the child being a
minor and the petitioner being an unmarried adult. 2 Thus, the only remaining issue
was whether the adoption would be beneficial to the child. The court explained:
"The polestar by which courts in Ohio, and courts around the country, have been
guided is the best interest of the child to be adopted. This standard is applied in
25OiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(2) (West 2000).
26OIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(1) (West 2000). Similar provisions are found in
other states. See Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On
Judicial Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REv.
1021, nn. 6 & 7 (1999).
27See discussion infra 18-19 & 30-33.
281n re Adoption of Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ohio 1996) (word in bracket added).
29State ex rel. Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 11-12 (Ohio
1974).
30552 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1990).
3 
'd. at 886.
321d.
[Vol. 48: 101
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every adoption case and the case before us can be no different."33 The court further
instructed the probate court to "consider all relevant factors before determining what
is in the child's best interest," and then to exercise its "broad discretion in making
the determination" on the adoption petition. 4
Thus, Mr. B was allowed to adopt his son. As Mr. B's partner did not seek to
adopt the child, the court did not address the legality of that possibility.
It is against this statutory and common-law backdrop that In re Adoption of Jane
Doe was litigated.
III. IN RE ADOPTION OF JANE DOE35
A. Factual Background
Trish Smith and Marcia Jones became life partners in 198 1.36 They were united
as a couple in a Quaker union ceremony and consider themselves married in the eyes
of their religion even if not recognized in the eyes of the law.37 After being together
about eight years, they decided to bring a child into the world.38 Their daughter, Jane
Doe, was born on July 28, 1990, in Akron, Ohio.39 Marcia is Jane's biological
mother.4"
Jane was conceived through artificial insemination at a hospital using a sperm
bank.4 Since the sperm donor was anonymous, there is no biological father of record
or in the eyes of the law. 42
Since Jane's birth, Marcia and Trish have shared in the parenting responsibilities
of the child, and Jane has, by all accounts, flourished under the loving care provided
by her parents. 3 For the first few years, Trish financially supported her family so
331d.
34 d. at 889.
35Pseudonyms were used throughout the appellate proceedings and in this article to protect
identity of the child. The pleadings, motions, court orders and other documents in the probate
court record contain the parties' real names. That record has been sealed to protect the parties'
identities. The sealed record necessitates reliance on the briefs filed at the appellant level to
document what occurred at the trial level. Attorneys Peter Cahoon and James Chapman of
Akron, Ohio, and Patricia Logue of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund's
Midwest Office served as legal counsel for the petitioners.
36Brief for Appellants at 7, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App.
1998).
3 7Brief for Appellants at 9.
3 1d. at 8.
39 d. at 7.
40 d. at 6.
41Brief for Appellants at 8; Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 2, In re Adoption of Jane Doe,
719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
42 d. See also Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (West 2000); In re Adoption of Zschach,
665 N.E.2d 1070, 1073-74 (Ohio 1996).
43Brief for Appellants at 7 - 10.
2000]
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that Marcia could stay home and care for Jane." Persons acquainted with Trish,
Marcia, and Jane through Jane's school, day care, neighbors, faith community,
friends and relatives submitted affidavits that they are a happy, healthy family.45
Despite this de facto parent-child relationship between Trish and Jane, the two
remain total strangers in the eyes of the law. For example, Jane cannot be covered
under Trish's health insurance policy - in this case it is an important issue because
Jane suffers from ulcerative colitis that requires expensive medication and may
require hospitalization from time to time.' If anything happens to Marcia, Jane may
not be able to obtain insurance due to this pre-existing condition.47 Also, Trish is a
beneficiary to an inter vivos family trust; if Jane were her natural or adopted
daughter, Jane could inherent from this trust.
4
Perhaps more important than health insurance or financial concerns are the
psychological benefits and emotional security Jane would have if her relationship
with each of her moms is recognized and protected by the law.49  If legally
recognized through adoption, the relationship between Trish and Jane would be
preserved, even if Trish and Marcia ever go their separate ways. In that event, the
court would decide custody and visitation arrangements; if that happened now, Trish
would have a very difficult time trying to even get visitation rights to see Jane50 and
custody is virtually out of the question.
If Marcia becomes incapacitated or dies, necessitating appointment of a guardian
for Jane, Trish would be a stranger to Jane in the eyes of the law.5 In terms of legal
"Id. at 8.
45id.
4Id. at 10.
47Id. at 11.
48Brief for Appellants at 11.
49Id. at 12.
50See Liston v. Pyles, No. 97APO1-137, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 3627 (Franklin Cty.
Aug. 12, 1997) (unreported) (asserting that lesbian and/or homosexual partners have neither
statutory nor equitable rights to court-ordered visitation with children those partners raised
jointly with the birth or other legal parent of the child).
5tThe law allows Marcia to use a power of attorney to designate her intent that Trish be
appointed Jane's guardian in the event of Marcia's incapacity; Marcia can also include a
testamentary guardianship clause in her will indicating her intent that Trish be made Jane's
legal guardian if Marcia dies. Neither of these options guarantees that Marcia's wishes will be
followed. Probate courts are not bound to following the testamentary guardianship if the court
determines, in its discretion, that such guardianship is not in the best interest of the child.
Henicle v. Flack, 3 Ohio App. 444 (1914). See generally L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Function,
Power and Discretion of Court Where There is a Testamentary Appointment of Guardian of
Minor, 67 A.L.R.2d 803 (1999). The validity of a durable power of attorney can be
challenged on a number of grounds. Issues regarding whether the attorney is acting in good
faith are often raised, and transfers of power from the principal to attorney in fact are highly
scrutinized by the court to assure fairness and fundamental soundness of the transfer. See,
e.g., In re Scott, 675 N.E.2d 1350 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Testa v. Roberts, 542 N.E.2d 654
(Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
[Vol. 48: 101
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standing, any blood relative of Marcia, and thus of Jane, would have superior legal
rights regarding Jane even if that person had never met Jane.
B. Initiation ofAdoption Procedures and Probate Court's Ruling
On October 16, 1996, the parents52 filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment in
the Probate Division of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. The complaint
sought a declaration that Trish could adopt Jane so that both parents would have full
legal standing as parents. On June 5, 1997, the trial judge denied the relief
requested, holding that Trish could not adopt Jane under Ohio law unless the
biological mother's (Marcia's) rights were terminated. 3
The probate court vacated this decision and allowed the parents to amend their
declaratory judgment complaint and submit additional briefing as to whether, in the
alternative, both parents could jointly adopt Jane upon the simultaneous termination
of Marcia's rights as birth mother. 4
In sum, through the initial and amended complaint for declaratory relief, parents
Trish and Marcia asked the probate court to:
I) Declare that Trish could adopt Jane without any loss of parental rights
to Marcia;55 or
2) Declare that Trish and Marcia could jointly adopt without Marcia
relinquishing her parental rights;56 or
3) Declare that Marcia could relinquish her parental rights to Jane
instantaneously with the granting of the adoption to both Trish and
Marcia.
57
The probate court appointed a Guardian Ad Litem (hereafter "GAL") to advise
the court on legal issues surrounding the adoption. 8 Consistent with the GAL's
interpretation of the law, the probate court concluded that Trish met Ohio's statutory
requirement of being a suitable person to adopt, but that the adoption would
automatically terminate Marcia's parental rights. This decision was based on a strict
application of a statutory provision that states: "a final decree of adoption ... shall
have the following effects ... except with respect to a spouse of the petitioner ... to
relieve the biological ... parents .. . of all parental rights."59
Accordingly, in an opinion issued March 4, 1998, the probate court denied all
relief requested by Trish and Marcia. The probate court reasoned" that R.C.
52Since Marcia is the biological parent of Jane and Trish is Jane's de facto parent, the term
"parents" is used throughout this article to refer collectively to Trish and Marcia.
53Brief for Appellants at 7.
5Id.
55Id. at 6-7, 11.
5Id. at 7, 11.
57Id.
58Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 2, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1998).
59OnHo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(1) (West 2000).
60The probate court decision did not use pseudonyms, and all parts of the record that refer
to the parties by their real names are sealed. Therefore, references to the probate court's
2000]
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§ 3107.15(A)(1) 61 allows retention of parental rights of a child by the biological
parent only when the spouse of the biological parent, i.e. the stepparent of the child,
is adopting the child.62 In cases such as Jane's, where the person seeking to adopt is
not a legally recognized spouse63 of the biological parent, the probate court
interpreted R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) as automatically terminating the biological
mother's rights upon adoption by someone other than the spouse/stepparent. In
short, the probate court held that the "stepparent provision" found in R.C.
§ 3107.15(A)(1) did not prohibit Trish from adopting Jane, but held that this
adoption would automatically terminate Marcia's parental rights.'
The probate court also rejected the argument advanced by the parents that the
appropriate focus on "the best interest of the child"65 negated application of the
stepparent provision to terminate Marcia's rights upon Trish's adoption of Jane.
The probate court provided two reasons for rejecting the parents' argument that
the "best interest of the child" mandated approval of this adoption. First, the probate
court held that the parents' argument would be more plausible if the case involved an
abandoned child or a child without a parent. In that situation, the "best interest of the
child" could be employed to avoid strict statutory construction.66 But since Jane
already has one natural parent, the court concluded that the need for adoption is not
so critical to the child's best interest. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the child in
this case has a natural parent, and the need for an adoptive parent is not as pressing
as the non-parent situation, the child's interest must be given less weight when
weighed against the clear legislative mandate of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1)."6 7
Second, the court reasoned that because adoption in Ohio is a creature of statute,
strict compliance is necessary, especially where the language is as clear as the
stepparent adoption provision of R.C. § 3107.1 5(A)(1) appeared to this court.68
decision herein are, as evidenced by the accompanying footnotes, based on statements about
or summaries of the probate court's decision as presented (1) in the briefs filed with Ninth
District Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Ohio and (2) in the court of appeal's In re
Jane Doe opinion published at 719 N.E.2d 1071 (1998).
61Brief for Appellants at 7. In relevant part, Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(1) (West
2000) provides that a "final decree of adoption... shall have the following effects ... except
with respect to a spouse of the petitioner ... to relieve the biological ... parents ... of all
parental rights."
62Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 3.
63
"Spouse" is not defined in Ohio's adoption statutes. The probate court consulted case
law and a dictionary to conclude that "spouse" means "one's husband or wife" and connotes a
heterosexual relationship. Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 3, n.5.
64Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 3; Brief for Appellants at 15.
65As previously noted, the "best interest of the child" standard pervades Ohio's statutory
adoption scheme. See e.g. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § § 3107.11, 3107.14 (West 2000). See also
In re Adoption of Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1073 (1996) ("goal of adoption statutes is to
protect the best interests of the child.").
66Brief for Appellants at 16.
6 7 1d"
6sSee In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1072 (explaining reason of probate
court's decision).
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The probate court did not explicitly address the parents' independent, alternative
argument that Ohio law allows Trish and Marcia, each independently eligible to
adopt as an "unmarried adult"69 under Ohio law, to both adopt Jane upon the
simultaneous and instantaneous voluntary termination by Marcia of her parental
rights.70
C Parents 'Arguments in the Court ofAppeals
The parents appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Ninth District, Summit
County, but the appeal was actually heard by three judges from the Fifth District at
the request of and on behalf of the Ninth District.71 The parents raised two
assignments of error deserving de novo review:
72
1) The trial court erred in holding that it has no authority to grant the
adoption of Jane by de facto parent Trish without terminating
biological parent Marcia's rights; and
2) The trial court erred by failing to declare that it had the authority to let
Marcia legally relinquish her rights along with instantaneous adoption
of Jane by both Marcia and Trish.73
In support of their arguments, the parents directed the appeals court's attention to
several Supreme Court of Ohio and Ohio court of appeals decisions where the courts
had rejected literal application of the statutory requirements to serve the best
interests of a child.74 Appellants primarily based this argument on cases such as
Summers," where the Supreme Court of Ohio empowered probate courts to disregard
certain statutory bars to an adoption where the adoption was in the child's best
interest.
Pairing this ample weight of authority with the best-interest-of-the-child mandate
that permeates the letter and the spirit of Ohio's adoption statutes, the parents argued
that "literal application of R.C. § 3107.15 is inappropriate because it would not serve
the goals of the act, and would produce an unjust result contrary to Jane's best
interests."" Appellants continued:
69R.C. § 3107.03(B) allows "an unmarried adult" to adopt. Under Ohio's rules of statutory
interpretation, references to singular include the plural and vice versa. Omno REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1.43(A) (West 2000). Thus, R.C. § 3107.03(B) allows for "unmarried adults" to adopt.
70
"The court below either did not address these arguments or thought this option
foreclosed under the [Ohio adoption] act." Brief for Appellants at 38.
7
'This transfer was made at the request of the Ninth District judges but the reasons for the
request remain part of the sealed record.
72Brief for Appellants at 5; Appellants Reply Brief at 1-2. The parents argued that de
novo review was appropriate because the appeal arose from a declaratory judgment action
involving questions of law.
73Brief for Appellants at 5, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App.
1998).
74 Brief for Appellants at 17-22.
75As previously noted, the Summers court instructed the probate court to disregard the
statutory requirement that agency consent be obtained for an adoption. State, ex rel. Portage
Cty. Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 11-12 (Ohio 1974).
76Brief for Appellants at 22.
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The provisions of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) preserving the rights of a
biological or other legal parent in stepparent adoption demonstrates that
the legislature already has recognized in comparable circumstances that
maintaining a child's legal relationship with her parent serves a
compelling and paramount purpose. The same is true here where, from
Jane's perspective, the exact same interests are at stake. Even though the
legislature may not have had Jane's circumstances in mind [when it
enacted R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1)], the court must elevate them above all else
in construing the act, particularly when no other person's interests will be
infringed."'
In short, the parents argued that the court had not only the right, but the duty, to
allow Trish's adoption of Jane because it was not prohibited by Ohio law and was in
Jane's best interest.
D. Guardian Ad Litem's Role on Appeal
In her appellate brief, the GAL advised the court that probate court had appointed
her to respond to the legal issues raised in the declaratory judgment filed by the
parents seeking clarification that Trish was a proper party to adopt Jane.7" While this
is not an unprecedented role for a GAL,79 it differs from the statutorily designed GAL
role as advocate for the child." In fulfilling the task assigned by the court, and in
concluding that Jane's adoption should not be allowed as the parents desired, the
GAL became an adversary to the parents and arguably to Jane as well. Accordingly,
the GAL's role on appeal was directly analogous to that of an appellee defending the
lower court's decision.
In urging affirmance of the probate judge's decision, the GAL stated that she did
not independently verify the facts presented by the parents in their affidavits and in
77d. at 22 (bracketed material supplied).
78Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 2.
791n a New Jersey case, for example, a law professor was appointed to advise the court
whether the adoption by a same-sex partner of the biological mother was (I) in the child's best
interest and (2) compatible with New Jersey statutory law and public policy. Adoption of a
Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 551 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993). The J.M.G. court also
appointed a social service agency to make an additional assessment and recommendation as to
the child's best interest. Id.
80Ohio law authorizes appointment of a GAL in cases of abuse or neglect or when a minor
faces being adjudged delinquent or unruly and has no parent or guardian to advocate on the
child's behalf, Omo REV. CODE ANNt. § 2151.281 (West 2000), and when child custody is at
issue in a divorce case. Omo R. Civ. P. 75. The GAL may be an attorney who serves as legal
counsel for the child. OtIo REV. CODE AN.N. § 2151.281(H) (West 2000). If a conflict
develops in the GAL's efforts to act as factual investigator/advocate and legal counsel, the
court can relieve the GAL of her duties as legal counsel and she can continue as a factual
investigator and advocate for the child's best interest. Id. If the GAL is not an attorney, the
court can appoint legal counsel to advise the GAL. Id. In sum, "[t]he role of the guardian ad
litem is to investigate the ward's situation and then to ask the court to do what the guardian
feels is in the ward's best interest." In re Baby Girl Baxter, 479 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ohio 1985).
If the GAL is also an attorney, the role also includes the duty to "zealously represent" the
child's legal rights. Id.
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briefs regarding Jane's home life, but assumed the facts were true in briefing the
legal issues."1
The GAL's role as de facto appellee urging affirmance of the lower court's
decision resulted in her framing of the issues on appeal very differently than the
perspective presented by the parents. The GAL opinioned that "[t]his case is not
about the best interests of the child per se as asserted by Appellants. It is about
whether Ohio law allows the adoption they seek."82 Contrary to the parents' assertion
that the appeal involved a declaratory judgment based purely on questions of law,
and thus deserving de novo review, 3 the GAL claimed that the probate judge's
decision was reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard.
8 4
The GAL conceded that "[t]here is no question that Trish may adopt Jane under
Ohio law" because "[s]he is an 'unmarried adult' who may adopt pursuant to R.C.
§ 3107.03(B).""3 The GAL further recognized the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision
In re Adoption of Charles B that Trish's sexual orientation was not a bar to the
adoption. 6 However, the GAL posited that probate court was bound to strictly
interpret the statutes,87 and that the best interest test should not be applied to statutory
construction.8
The GAL argued:
Appellants confuse the analysis a probate court would apply when
considering a petition for adoption with the question of whether two
unmarried adults can adopt under the statutes of Ohio as raised in their
declaratory judgment complaint. The question of statutory construction is
governed by analysis of the applicable statutes using rules of construction.
While Appellants devote the majority of their brief to the best interests
test, their assertions are premature as the appropriateness of this particular
adoption is not yet at issue.89
Finally, the GAL claimed that if policy interests required a different law, then it was
up to the legislature, not the courts, to make that change after full debate of the
policy ramifications.'
'
1Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 3.
82 d at 2.
83Brief for Appellants at 5; Appellants Reply Brief at 1-2.
84Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 4.
85Id. at 3, 7.
87 d. at 4, 7.
8 d. at 7-10.
89Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 7.
9°M. at 6-7.
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E. Amici Curiae Weigh In
The Ohio Psychological Association, the National Association of Social Workers
(NASW), the Ohio Chapter of NASW, the American Academy of Child &
Adolescent Psychiatry, the Ohio Human Rights Bar Association, and the
Lesbian/Gay Community Service Center of Greater Cleveland all weighed in as
amici curiae favoring the adoption. No amicus briefs opposing the adoption were
filed.
Embracing the traditional amici curiae role, these organizations addressed neither
the factual issue of whether Jane's adoption by Trish was in the child's best interest
nor the legal issue of whether the probate court had misapplied Ohio's statutory
adoption scheme. Rather, amici offered empirical data and other relevant
information about gay parents and adoptions in an effort to expand the justices'
vision as to the impact of the case on families and children in Ohio and elsewhere.
For example, the amici pointed out that lower court's ruling prohibits not just gay
partners of people who have children from adopting, but also prevents any unmarried
couples from adopting a child.9 The amici explained that "[b]ecause children today
are being raised, and raised well, by grandparents, single parents, lesbian and gay
parents, and in other nontraditional family arrangements, standing to file adoption
petitions should not be construed so narrowly that children in need of stable, safe
homes will not find them. 92
Amici also explained, again based on strong empirical evidence, that a child's
attachment to his or her "psychological parent" is extremely well-documented and
important, and that disruption to that relationship for any period of time can be
exceedingly detrimental to the child.93 In turn, allowing adoption by unmarried
couples is "an important first step toward protecting the child's psychological ties" to
this de facto parent.94
In addition to psychological harm, the child may experience material deprivation
if the second parent is not allowed to adopt, amici explained. 9 For example, parents
covered by separate health insurance plans can choose the coverage that is optimal
for the child's needs.96 If the de facto parent has no will or if a will is invalidated,
lost, or successfully contested, Ohio law will protect the ability of an adopted child
to inherent through intestate succession.97 The adoption decree will also make the
91Brief Amicus Curiae of Ohio Psychological Association, National Association of Social
Workers and Ohio Chapter American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, Ohio
Human Rights Bar Association, and The Lesbian/Gay Community Service Center of Greater
Cleveland in Support of Appellants at 5, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1998).
921d.
93Brief Amicus Curiae at 6.
941d.
95Id. at 8.
961Id.
97Id. See also Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.15(A)(2) (West 2000) (the effect of adoption
is "to create the relationship of parent and child ... as if the adopted person were a legitimate
blood descendant of the petitioner, for all purposes including inheritance").
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child eligible for family trusts98 and social security death or disability benefits
available to the child of a disabled or deceased parent.99 In contrast, the de facto
child remains a stranger in the eyes of the law and is to receive no benefits or
inheritance upon the disability or death of the parent.
Amici also pointed out the well-documented need for interpretation of adoption
statutes to help expand, rather than restrict, the potential number of homes available
for the hundreds of thousands of children in foster homes awaiting placement in
permanent homes.'00 Further, amici explained that the concept of what constitutes a
family has changed significantly in this culture, and urged the court to make its
decision consistent with modem realities of children being raised by step-parents,
grandparents, friends, relatives, and gay and lesbian partners of the legally
recognized parent rather than relying solely on the prototypical model of family life
of a biological mother and biological father.'O Amici observed:
Other nontraditional family arrangements and alternative methods of
creating such families also exist. There are single men and women who
are adopting children; gay and lesbian couples who are becoming parents
through adoption, foster care, or artificial insemination; divorced parents
who are marrying new spouses, and, through the advances of medical
science, post-menopausal women who are becoming mothers. Again, as a
result of these new family contexts, courts have avoided a narrow
definition of "family" and sought to meet the needs of children
consistently with the goal of protecting the best interest of the child.'
0 2
Additionally, amici brought to the court's attention the fact that millions of
children"0 3 are being raised - and raised well0 4 - by gay or lesbian parents. Strong
empirical data demonstrates that such children are not adversely affected by their
9 Brief Amicus Curiae at 8.
99Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 402[d]); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 326 (Mass. 1993);
In re Jacob, 600 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re
Adoption of J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 552 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
'°°Brief Amicus Curiae at 9.
''Id. at 10-13.
102Id. at 12.
'°
3Id. at 13-25. Amici explained that estimates of the number of children of gay and
lesbian parents "range from six million, see J. SCHtJLENBERG, GAY PARENTING (1985), to eight
to ten million, see ABA Annual Meeting Provides Forum for Family Law Experts, 13 FAM. L.
REP. 1512, 1513 (1987), to six to fourteen million, Charlottee J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian
and Gay Parents, 63 CHILDDEV. 1025 (1992)." Brief Amicus Curiae at 13, n.17.
1°4Authorities amici brought to the court's attention in support of the parenting skills of
gay and lesbian parents include Susan Golombok & Fiona Tasker, Do Parents Influence the
Sexual Orientation of Their Children? Findings from a Longitudinal Study of Lesbian
Families, 32(1) DEV. PSYCHOL. 3 (1996); Carole Jenny et al., Are Children at Riskfor Sexual
Abuse by Homosexuals?, PEDIATRICS, July 1994, at 41-44; Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of
Lesbian and Gay Parents, 63 CHILD. DEV. 1025 (1992); Patricia J. Falk, Lesbian Mothers:
Psychosocial Assumptions in Family Law, 44 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 941 (1989); and FREDERICK
W. BOZETT, GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS (1987).
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parents' sexual orientation. To the contrary, the data confirm that variances in sexual
orientation constitute a healthy aspect of human diversity, that children with gay
parents are able to deal with any stigmatization or harassment just as children of
other minorities do, that children raised by gay men and lesbian women are not more
likely to become homosexuals than children raised by heterosexuals, and that there is
no connection - other than outdated myths - between sexual orientation and child
sexual abuse. 5
F. Court of Appeals Decision
The appellate court rejected the arguments of the parents and amici, holding that
the court below had not erred in (1) applying R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) to determine that
Trish could not adopt Jane without terminating Marcia's parental rights; and (2)
ruling that Ohio law did not allow Marcia and Trish to jointly adopt Jane upon
Marcia's instantaneous relinquishment of her parental rights to Jane.
0 6
The appeals court determined that Trish met the requirements of "an unmarried
adult" allowed to adopt under R.C. § 3107.03(B).. 7 and that no statutory provisions
barred her adoption of Jane. But in the appeals court's view, "the gravamen of this
appeal is what the effect of an adoption by appellant, 'an unmarried adult,' is on the
parental rights of the biological mother"'0 8 pursuant to R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) - a
classic "step-parent" provision.'
0 9
The court either did not consider, or considered but rejected without explanation,
the possibility that the stepparent provision was inapplicable to the facts of the case.
Rather, the court viewed R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) as establishing a bright-line,
universally applicable rule "that a final decree of adoption issued by an Ohio court
has the effect of terminating all parental rights of biological parents and creating
parental rights in adoptive parents." '' t
In reaching this conclusion, the appeals court agreed with the probate court and
GAL that since adoption is a creature of statute rather than of common law, the
courts must strictly construe the statutory provisions governing adoption."' Braced
with this perspective, the court rejected the parents' and amici's argument that
Ohio's adoption statutes and Supreme Court of Ohio precedent allowed, if not
required, an analysis and interpretation of the adoption statute on a case-by-case
105Brief Amicus Curiae at 13-25.
'°6In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). Although not
explicitly articulated in its ruling, the Court of Appeals reviewed the case on a de novo rather
than an abuse of discretion standard.
107Id. at 1072.
1081d.
'09See, e.g., In re Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035, 1057 (Conn. 1999); Bates v. Sanchez, 375
N.W.2d 353, 354 (Mich. 1985). See generally Barbara Findlay, All in the Family Values, 14
CA. J. FAm. L. 129 (1997).
10719 N.E.2d at 1072.
"'Id. The court later added: "we are adhering to the maxim 'adoption statues are in
derogation of common law and therefore must be strictly construed...'" 719 N.E.2d at 1073,
quoting In re Adoption of Zschach, 665 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ohio 1996).
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basis, and also rejected their argument that courts had the power to decline to apply
the literal language of the statutory provisions when doing so is in a particular child's
best interests. 112
The appeals court distinguished the Ohio precedent relied upon by appellants by
reasoning that previous cases allowing lower courts to decline to apply the literal
language of a provision in the adoption statute "emphasized the trial court's
discretion in determining eligibility to adopt,""' 3 while it characterized the case
before it as involving only "the effects of adoption."".4 The court characterized the
distinction between eligibility and effect as a "tremendous trifle" that was the
determinative factor in the case."' It explained:
Although we are mindful of the dilemma facing the parties and are
sympathetic to their plight, it is not within the constitutional scope of
judicial power to change the face and effect of the plain meaning of R.C.
§ 3107.15. This case is not about alternative lifestyles but statutory
construction. When we balance the spirit and motivation of the adoption
laws (as appellant argues) against the plain meaning of the statutory
language created by the state legislature, we are not empowered to find
the 'spirit' includes the issue presented sub judice.
Appellant argues we should use the best interest of the child test in
interpreting the statute. We find to do so would place the 'cart before the
horse.' Best interest pertains to the adoption process, not to the legal
effects of adoption. Based on the clear meaning of R.C. § 3107.15(A), we
find the trial court did not err in finding the biological mother's parental
rights would terminate upon adoption of the child by appellant, a non-
stepparent." 6
As to the issue of whether Marcia could voluntarily terminate her rights
simultaneously with the court granting a joint adoption by her and Trish, the court
said this issue was moot in light of its previous holding." 7
One member of the tribunal penned a concurrence to emphasize his belief that the
case presented a matter for the legislature, not the courts:" 8
Until such time as the General Assembly of Ohio changes the law
pertaining to same-sex marriages or rewrites the adoption statutes to
specifically allow the requested legal relationship, I cannot interpret into
the existing adoption statute a spousal relationship between two
"12Id.
"
31d.
"
41d. This was the position advocated by the GAL. See Brief of Guardian Ad Litem at 9.
"'719 N.E.2d at 1073.
"
61d.
"
71d. at 1073.
18ld. (Wise, J., concurring).
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individuals of the same sex such as to create a step-parent relationship in a
legal context." 9
G. Seeking Review by the Supreme Court of Ohio
1. The Parents' Arguments in Support of Jurisdiction
The parents had no appeal as a right to the Supreme Court of Ohio. Rather, they
had to convince the court, by filing a memorandum in support of jurisdiction, that
their case presented issues "of public or great general interest." 2 '
The parents argued that further review of this case was of great public interest
because the result effected a gross injustice to Jane and children similarly situated. It
deprived such children of the emotional and financial security that would accompany
adoption by a second (non-spousal) parent. 2' It is also of great public interest, the
parents contended, to "restore the probate courts to their paramount position as
protectors of children in adoption proceedings."' 22 "Trial courts in at least sixteen
other states have approved such adoptions, and many thousands of couples nationally
have secured their child's best interests through this mechanism," the parents wrote,
adding that "Ohio children are no less in need of this vital legal safeguard." '23 They
further argued:
American society is awash in discussion of the needs of changing families
and the rights of its gay and lesbian citizens. This court has set an
enviable standard in past cases for deciding these issues dispassionately,
in the light of the best interests of the children before it, proven facts and
the application of settled law. That is all appellants ask here.'24
Touching on the merits of the case, the parents asserted that the trial and
appellate courts' interpretation of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) was incorrect because they
constituted "slavish application of the literal terms of Ohio statutes" without due
regard of the "unjust and unreasonable results" in this and similar cases. 2 The
parents also argued that any barriers to Jane's adoption presented by the stepparent
119 d
"
120OIO SuP. CT. R 3. Memos in support of jurisdiction put an attorney's advocacy skills
to the test. The primary objective is, of course, to convince the court that the case is of
significant public interest. But the memorandum also presents an opportunity to make
preliminary arguments as to the merits of the appeal. Compelling preliminary arguments on
the merits, in turn, may inspire the court to take the case to correct an injustice, to clarify the
law, or to establish new standards in a given area of law, because accomplishing such tasks is
so clearly in the public's interest.
'
21Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction of Appellants Trish Smith and Marcia Jones.
In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 86 Ohio St.3d 1408 (Ohio 1999) (hereinafter "Appellants'
Memorandum in Support").
122Appellants' Memorandum in Support at 2.
123Id. at 3.
1241d.
1251d. at 6.
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statute were, contrary to the decisions of the courts below, irrelevant to the issue of
the parents' ability to jointly adopt Jane upon the simultaneous relinquishment by the
biological mother's parental rights.
21
2. The Amici Perspective
The Amici enumerated six reasons that the case satisfied the court's "public or
great general interest" criteria.'27 These grounds included providing the court with
the opportunities "to reinvigorate the 'best interest of the child' mandate,"' 28 to
"preempt repetitive and perhaps conflicting efforts by the lower courts in Ohio"
adjudicating second-parent adoption cases, 29 to establish the right for Jane and
children similarly situated to "have two parents legally obligated to care for them,'
30
and to "forge a leadership role in the development and evolution of family law
jurisprudence that recognizes the realities of children's lives.''.
The Amici Memorandum also provided, in significantly condensed manner,
empirical data on the value of two-parent households and the excellent quality of life
enjoyed by children of same-sex couples. 3 2
3. The GAL's Opposition to Further Review
The GAL asserted that the case was not of great public interest because "[t]he
great public interest debate they [appellants] seek to wage is a matter of public policy
soundly lodged in the province of the legislature.' 3 3 The GAL cited the presence of
Amici as evidence that "there may be a significant number of interested parties who
should have the opportunity to weigh in on the public policy issues associated with
the extension of the adoption laws."' 34
In defending the merits of the decisions below, the GAL made two arguably
incongruous arguments.' First, the GAL argued that this was a declaratory
judgment matter, not an adoption case, and therefore the "best interest of the child"
standard was not applicable. "This is not an adoption case; it is a declaratory
judgment action in which the Appellants urge the courts to judicially legislate," the
26 d. at 13-14.
'27Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction Submitted in Support of Appellants by Amicus
Curiae, In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 86 Ohio St.3d 1408 (Ohio 1999) (hereinafter "Amici
Memorandum").
'
28Amici Memorandum at 5.
1291d.
Id. at 5-6.
13id. at 6.
"2M. at 7-14.
'3Memorandum in Response to Appellants' Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction, In
re Adoption of Jane Doe, 86 Ohio St.3d 1408 (Ohio 1999) (hereinafter "GAL'S
Memorandum").
1341d.
'5See GAL's Memorandum.
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GAL wrote. Thus, "[t]he best interests of the child test, while appropriate in an
adoption case, is not appropriate in the action filed by Appellants."'36
Second, the GAL opined that since the adoption law governing disposition of this
case is in derogation of common law, adoption statutes must be strictly and narrowly
construed.'37 "The court of appeals found that R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) was not
ambiguous in its language or meaning and, therefore, must be followed," the GAL
opined.3 ' Since strict construction is mandated in this case, the GAL further
reasoned, "[u]nmarried partners cannot defeat the plain meaning of R.C. § 3107.15
by jointly adopting after the natural parent relinquishes her parental rights." '39
Thus, the GAL's circular reasoning left the parents (and others similarly situated)
in a dizzying legal predicament. Pursuant to the GAL's logic, the parents could not
utilize their most compelling argument based on Jane's best interest, since the best
interest provision in the adoption statute governs adoption petitions only and not
declaratory judgment actions regarding adoption matters. But having been denied
use of the "best interest" language in the adoption statue, another provision of the
adoption statute - the so-called step-parent provision - would be strictly construed
against them to deny Tricia's adoption of Jane unless Marcia's rights were
terminated.
H. Decision of Supreme Court of Ohio Declining Jurisdiction
On April 28, 1999, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the appeal without an
opinion.'" Three of the seven justices dissented both from the original denial' and
from the court's subsequent rejection of the parents' motion for reconsideration.12
Since the Supreme Court of Ohio offered no insight as to the justices' reasons for
denying review, it is difficult to read anything into its decision. In fact, it is not even
safe to assume that the three justices who favored review were inclined to take the
case for the purpose of reversing rather than affirming the lower court decisions. In
any event, the decision not to hear the case finally resolves the matter as to Marcia,
Trish, and Jane, but it is not an affirmance per se. Thus, it does not create binding
statewide precedent.
IV. FLAws IN THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURT DECISIONS
The resolution of In re Jane Doe is a classic example of courts missing not only
the boat but the entire harbor as well. This navigational error is due to fundamental
flaws in application of general rules of statutory interpretation.
As the court of appeals noted, "[t]his case is not about alternative lifestyles but
statutory construction."'" This is true. But error arose in the court's analysis of the
136GAL's Memorandum at 1.
137d. at 2.
138GAL's Memorandum at 6; see also id. at 6-9.
139d. at 4.
140In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 709 N.E.2d 173 (Ohio 1999).
141Justices Moyer, Douglas and Pfeifer dissented from the denial of the appeal. Id.
142In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 711 N.E.2d 234 (Ohio 1999).
143719 N.E.2d at 1073.
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case as if only one rule of statutory interpretation exists, to wit, that strict
construction is required where statutes create rights nonexistent at common law.
Other rules of equal or even greater influence should have informed the court's
decision in this case.
Ohio's "cardinal rule" of statutory interpretation "is that all statutes relating to
the same general subject matter must be read in para materia."'" Words and phrases
are given their common meaning unless they have been assigned or have acquired a
technical or particular meaning."' Presumptions that accompany the enactment of
legislation include that the "entire statute is intended to be effective" and "a just and
reasonable result is intended."' 46 If a statute is ambiguous, the courts determine an
appropriate construction by consulting "among other things, the common law, the
object sought to be attained by the legislature, and the consequence of a particular
construction."' 47 Conversely, where a "statute conveys a meaning that is clear,
unequivocal and definite,"'48 the court's "interpretative effort is at an end, and the
statute must be applied accordingly."' 49 However, strict compliance with a statute is
not required where the statute itself is clearly inapplicable to the facts of the case.'
Finally, a "statute should not be interpreted to yield an absurd result."''
Accordingly, a court should reject statutory interpretation that yields "any absurd
consequences, manifestly contradictory to common reason" or that produces
"consequences of great absurdity or injustice. '
As the courts and the parties readily conceded in this matter, adoption is a
creature of statute, and thus strict statutory construction is one of the rules that guide
the court's decision-making process in this case. But the interpretation adopted by
the lower courts "strictly construes" Ohio's adoption statutes in a manner that
directly violates several equally compelling rules of statutory construction articulated
above.
144Yonkings v. Wilkinson, 714 N.E.2d 394, 396 (Ohio 1999).
1450mo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.42 (Anderson 2000).
1460Mo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.47 (Anderson 2000).
147Christe v. GMS Mgt. Co. Inc., 726 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ohio 2000) (citing R.C. § 1.49).
'48City of Lancaster v. Fairfield Cty. Budget Comm., 699 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ohio 1998)
(quoting Provident Bank v. Wood, 304 N.E.2d 378, 381 (Ohio 1973)).
149Id
'
50See, e.g., State v. Nagel, 703 N.E.2d 773, 778 (Ohio 1999) (as a general rule, a
defendant's waiver of the right to have "criminal proceedings" heard by a jury does not apply
to a waiver only relevant to the sentencing phase of the trial).
'
5
'Mishr v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 667 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ohio 1996) (citations omitted).
'
52Slater v. Cave, 3 Ohio St. 80, 83-84 (Ohio 1853). For an excellent discussion of the
absurd results principle, see Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity and the Limits of Literalism:
Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U. LAW REv. 127
(1994).
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A. Applying Statutory Provisions in Para Materia
General rules of statutory construction require that related provisions of a
statutory scheme be read in conjunction with each other to achieve the legislature's
intent. Moreover, and as the court of appeals noted here, OHIO REV. CODE § 3107.14
explicitly demands that "adoption matters must be decided on a case-by-case basis
through the able exercise of discretion by the trial court giving due consideration to
all known factors in determining what is in the best interest of the person to be
adopted."' 3 The supremacy of the "best interest of the child" provision has been
recognized by the Supreme Court of Ohio in decisions that have overridden literal
statutory requirements - such as the requisite approval of the adoption agency -
when it is in the adoptee's best interest to do so.'
Thus, the court of appeal's reasoning that focuses on the best interest of the child
"would place the 'cart before the horse '""" is simply incorrect. To the contrary, both
the legislation itself and the interpretation of the statute by the state's highest court
instruct Ohio courts to do exactly what the appeals court refused to do here: always
place the best interest of the child first. 56The court of appeals defends its decision by distinguishing between statutory
provisions that set the standards for assessing the merits of an adoption petition and
the provision that governs the effects of the adoption.'57 But what the appeals court
ignores is that all these provisions are part of a single, unified statutory scheme that
the Supreme Court of Ohio has repeatedly recognized as being legitimately
implemented in furtherance of the best interests of the child. Thus, provisions
governing the "effects" of adoption are equally entitled to interpretation under the
best interests of the child standard.
In addition, the court of appeal's interpretation of the statute as terminating
Marcia's parental rights upon Jane's adoption by Trish extracts a result identical to
denying the adoption petition on the merits. The difference is that the court's
decision predicated on the effects of the adoption creates a de facto bar to Jane's
adoption by Trish, while a ruling on the merits creates a legal bar. But, a bar is a bar,
regardless of the adjective that proceeds it. In short, the court's differential treatment
of the "merits" and the "effects" provisions of Ohio's adoption statutes fabricates a
distinction where there is no difference.
153In re Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1072.
'5State ex rel. Portage County Welfare Dept. v. Summers, 311 N.E.2d 6, 11-12 (Ohio
1974).
'15719 N.E.2d at 1073.
'-56The irrefutable facts of this case show that Trish and Marcia are excellent parents, and
that Trish's adoption by Jane would be in Jane's best interest. See text and accompanying
pages 13-16. And while readily acknowledging that every adoption case must be judged on its
own merits, the amicus curiae provided empirical, sociological and psychological data
demonstrating that second-parent, same-sex adoptions significantly benefit the child's mental
and physical well-being.
1571n re Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d at 1073.
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B. Obtaining the Legislature's Objectives
The position adopted by the courts below that R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) is
unambiguous and must be literally applied to strip Marcia of her parental rights if
Trish adopts Jane overlooks another critical threshold step in statutory application.
That is, the statute neither expressly addresses, nor by its language remotely
suggests, that it covers same-sex, second-parent adoptions. Therefore, it is simply
irrelevant to the issues raised by second-parent adoptions. 158  The statute's
inapplicability is one of the reasons that its application here runs contrary to the
legislature's intent in adopting Ohio's statutory adoption scheme.
R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) terminates "all parental rights and responsibilities" of any
"biological or other legal parents of the adopted person." If this constituted the
whole of R.C. § 3107..15(A)(1), then the lower court's interpretation of the statute as
terminating biological mother Marcia's parental rights to Jane upon Trish's adoption
of Jane might be appropriate.
But R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) does not make such a universal statement. Rather, it
contains an important phrase limiting its applicability to the termination of parental
rights accompanying an adoption. That is, R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) terminates parental
rights "[e]xcept with respect to a spouse of the petitioner and relatives of the
spouse." This language has led courts, litigants and commentators to refer to such
provisions as "the step-parent provision." '159
The plain language of this exception makes clear that the scenario the legislature
intended R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) to address does not exist in this case, nor does it exist
in any case where there is only one "legal" parent of the child. The scenario
contemplated by the statute is where two persons (usually both biological parents)
already possess parental rights and responsibilities, and a third party petitions to
adopt the child. In fact, this scenario represents the most common form of adoption
in America. 60 Absent the termination effect in R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1), the child
would have three legally recognized parents. The Ohio legislature has apparently
decided that this is not a desirable result, 16' and it is not alone in that decision.
1581n this respect the step-parent provision is akin to other provisions in Ohio adoption
law, such as the requirement that consent be obtained from an agency who has permanent
custody of the child, or that a putative father be notified of a proposed adoption that will
terminate his parental rights.
159See, e.g., In re Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035, 1057 (Conn. 1999); Bates v. Sanchez, 375
N.W.2d 353, 354 (Mich. 1985). See generally Barbara Findlay, All in the Family Values, 14
CAN. J. FAM. L. 129 (1997).
160Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial
Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REv. 1019,
1020, n.5 (1999).
161Although one might argue that having more than two persons legally responsible for a
child would be in the child's best interest, potential downsides to such a scenario are obvious.
Having three (or more) people with equal parental rights in the eyes of the law, who may have
some animosity toward each other based on the break up of past marriages or relationships,
could result in repeated visits to the court over disputes such as the religious training the child
should receive, the educational path to be followed, whether a particular course of medical
treatment should be pursued, and other issues intrinsic to child rearing. In short, there is some
wisdom in the law limiting the chorus of voices that have standing regarding the critical
decisions attendant to raising children.
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Indeed, "courts have acknowledged that allowing one or both of the biological
parents to retain parental rights would greatly complicate raising the child without
affording a benefit to justify the complication" '162 in cases where the adoption would
already create two legal parents.
The critical point overlooked by the court of appeals is that in such step-parent
situations, R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) preserves, rather than terminates, the rights of the
existing legal parent who supports the adoption of her child by the petitioner. Thus,
the court's application here of R.C. § 3107.15 to terminate the rights of the sole
existing legal and biological parent is antithetical to the purpose of a statute that
seeks to ensure - through the preservation of one existing legal relationship and the
creation of another - two legal parents for the adopted child.
The court of appeal's interpretation of R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) as mandating
termination of Marcia's rights is contradicted by the very Supreme Court of Ohio
cases that the court of appeals cites in support for its "strict construction" holding.
Collectively, Kaylor v. Bruening,'63 Smith v. Smith,164 and In re Adoption of Greer'65
recognize that R.C. § 3107.15(A) terminates the rights of some biological parents.
These cases do not hold, however, as the court of appeals suggests,"6 that all
biological parents' rights are terminated.1 67 To the contrary, two of these cases -
Kaylor and Greer - are stepparent situations. In both those cases the parental rights
of the biological parent who is a spouse of the petitioner are expressly preserved.
Moreover, the court in each case construed R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) narrowly in light of
constitutional, statutory, and case law that demand protection "of the right of the
natural parents to raise and nurture their children." '68 The court in these cases
expressly sought to further the "noble objective" of preserving the child-parent
relationship, a relationship that the court characterized as "a bond which constitutes
one of the most fundamental relationships upon which our society is based."'69
162Mark Strasser, Courts, Legislatures, and Second-Parent Adoptions: On Judicial
Deference, Specious Reasoning, and the Best Interests of the Child, 66 TENN. L. REv. 1019,
1022 (1999) (footnote omitted).
163684 N.E.2d 1228 (Ohio 1997).
'64662 N.E.2d 366 (Ohio 1996).
165638 N.E.2d 999 (Ohio 1994).
'66719 N.E.2d at 1072.
167Both Greer and Kaylor are classic step-parent adoptions where the right of the
biological parent married to the petitioner were preserved rather than destroyed by the
adoption.
'6'Greer, 638 N.E.2d at 1005.
169Greer, 638 N.E.2d at 1003. Thus, in Greer, the court held that a putative father's right
to contest adoption by the biological mother's spouse was not waived by failing to file an
objection within thirty days as required by a strict reading of the applicable statute. In Smith,
the court held that an adoption petition approved by' South Africa upon consent of one
biological parent may be contrary to the law and public policy of Ohio, thus denying the South
African judgment full faith and credit.
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The foregoing analysis does not suggest, as one of the court of appeals judges
feared, 7 ' that the step-parent provision protects Marcia's parental rights because
Trish qualifies as a "spouse" of Marcia. To the contrary, Trish is qualified to adopt
Jane because she meets the statutory requirement of being "an unmarried adult" 7 '
who cannot, in Ohio, be recognized as Marcia's spouse.172 Rather, the usual effect of
R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) to limit a child to two legal parents, demonstrates that the
legislature did not intend the biological mother's rights to be terminated in the
scenario presented in In re Jane Doe. Simply stated, "the law accords protections to
a natural parent when the adoption of a child is proposed." '73 This shield is designed
to protect a child such as Jane by providing two legally recognized parents. It should
not, therefore, be used as a sword to sever Jane's legal relationship with her
'biological parent.
C. Avoiding Absurd Results
Invoking any provision of Ohio adoption statutes to sever the legal relationship
between a child and a biological mother who has been and intends to continue being
an excellent parent is absurd when weighed against the intent of the legislature to
create loving, stable homes, frequently consisting of two parents, for children. This
absurd result can and should be avoided.
Courts outside of Ohio have taken this path. In a 1993 decision,174 for example,
Vermont's highest court refused to apply that state's statutory step-parent provision
to terminate the parental rights of the birth mother upon adoption of her two-children
by the mother's same sex partner. The court reasoned:
The intent of the legislature was to protect the security of family units by
defining the legal rights and responsibility of children who find
themselves in circumstances that do not include two biological parents.
Despite the narrow wording of the step-parent exception, we cannot
conclude that the legislature ever meant to terminate the parental rights of
a biological parent who intended to continue raising a child with the help
of a partner. Such a narrow construction would produce the unreasonable
and irrational result of defeating adoptions that are otherwise indisputably
in the best interests of children.'75
A New York court reached the same conclusion, recognizing that enforcement of
New York's step-parent provision to terminate the biological partner's rights "would
be an absurd outcome which would nullify the advantage sought by the proposed
adoption: the creation of a legal family unit identical to the actual family setup."'76
170719 N.E.2d at 1073 (Wise, J., concurring).
'
711d. at 1072.
1721d at 1073 (Wise, J., concurring).
173Smith, 662 N.E.2d at 369.
174Adoptions of B.L.V.D. and E.I.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
1751d. at 1274.
1761n re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1992).
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Accordingly, Ohio courts should hold that R.C. § 3107.15(A)(1) has no application
to same-sex, second parent adoptions.
An alternative, equally defendable analysis pursuant to the rule of statutory
construction prohibiting absurd results entails holding the step-parent provision
applicable by analogy. In that application, Marcia is deemed directly analogous to
the "spouse" excepted from the parental termination effects of R.C. § 3107.15.
Thus, Marcia's parental status is unaffected by Trish's adoption of Jane. Ohio cases
such as Lawson v. Atwood 77 provide precedent for such an analysis.
The Lawson plaintiff sought recovery under the Ohio Wrongful Death Statute
71
for the death of Gina Lawson, an 18-year-old he had raised as his own child. The
court described the relationship between Lawson and his decedent, Gina Lawson, as
follows:
The evidence is undisputed that Gina, from age two until her death sixteen
years later, lived with appellant, and that he loved her and treated her as if
she were his natural child. He received Gina's society, companionship,
and filial obedience. He represented Gina to the world as his child and he
received the benefits of her love and affection as though he were her
natural father.' 9
Following Gina's death in an automobile accident, plaintiff initiated a wrongful
death suit against the driver and the owner of the other vehicle. The trial court
granted and the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment for defendants because
plaintiff had never adopted Gina, and thus was not a legally recognized "parent"
entitled to a remedy for her death under the literal language of the statute. 8 ' The
Supreme Court of Ohio unanimously reversed.
In recognizing plaintiff s standing to pursue the claim, the court characterized the
wrongful death act as remedial in nature. Being remedial, it "must be construed to
promote the objectives of the Act and to assist the parties in obtaining justice."' 81
The court recognized three objectives of the Act: "(1) to compensate those who have
been deprived of a relationship, (2) to ensure that tortfeasors bear the cost of
wrongful acts, and (3) to deter harmful conduct which may result in death."''8 2
The court rejected the doctrine of "equitable adoption" as grounds for
recognizing plaintiff's standing, stating that "indiscriminate application of such a
177536 N.E.2d 1167 (Ohio 1989).
178O-iO REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01-.02 (West 2000). The statute allows designated
parties to sue for an intentional or negligent act of another that results in death. Omo REv.
CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (West 2000). The action is brought in the name of the personal
representative of the decedent "for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children,
and parents of the decedent, all of whom are rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by
reason of the wrongful death, and for the exclusive benefit of the other next of kin of the
decedent." Omuo REv. CODE ANN. § 2125.02 (West 2000).
179536 N.E.2d at 1169.
' 
01d. at 1168.
'
8
'Id. (citations omitted).
82Ild. (citations omitted).
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broad legal principle is not desirable." ' 3 The court also acknowledged "a dearth of
authority to guide our application of the Ohio Wrongful Death Act to the facts of this
case."' 4 Thus, the purpose of the statute - "to permit a recovery from the tortfeasor
for the loss occasioned by the wrongful death"' 5 - was the sole guide the court had
for determining whether the statutory specification of "parent" includes persons
similarly situated to the plaintiff.
The court concluded that the purpose of the statute was furthered by allowing
plaintiff and others similarly situated to pursue a wrongful death claim, provided that
plaintiffs "established a parental relationship by clear and convincing evidence."' 6
The court further articulated a four-factor test for establishing the requisite child-
parent relationship. The test requires proof that the plaintiff had "performed the
obligations of parenthood for a substantial period of time,"'8 7 and that "[t]he
relationship between the child and the one claiming to be parent had been publicly
recognized."'' 8
Lawson is instructive to the court's analysis of In re Jane Doe for at least four
reasons. First, both the adoption and wrongful death statutes create rights and
remedies unknown at common law.'89 Thus, strict construction of the statutes'
provisions is implicated. Second, the statutes in each case are remedial in nature. 9 °
As a general rule, remedial statutes are liberally construed. 9' This second factor
militates against absolute strict construction that narrows the remedies provided
under the statutes.'92 Third, both statutes are predicated on a traditional family model
'"
3Id. at 1169.
184536 N.E.2d at 1169.
185d.
'
861d.
"SId. at 1170.
188 d.
'
8 9At common law, remedies for personal injuries died with the person who suffered them.
Accordingly, the right to sue for wrongful death in Ohio is a statutorily created right that was
not recognized at common law. Rubeck v. Huffman, 374 N.E.2d 411 (Ohio 1978).
J901n the wrongful death situation, the statute provides a remedy for the death of a loved
one; in adoption matters, the remedy sought is establishing one or more legally recognized
parent responsible for the care and well being of a child.
191Lawson, 536 N.E.2d at 1168. See also Barker v. State, 402 N.E.2d 550 (Ohio 1980)
(statute that is remedial in nature should be given liberal construction to assist parties in
obtaining justice); Lorms v. State, 357 N.E.2d 1067 (Ohio 1976) (same); McKenzie v. Racing
Comm., 215 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1966) (same).
192The Lawson decision omits any reference to the Wrongful Death Act as being in
derogation of common law, thus requiring strict construction, while the In re Jane Doe
decision omits any reference to adoption statutes being remedial in nature, thus requiring
liberal construction. These omissions are interesting in light of the characterizations of these
statutes in Supreme Court of Ohio cases. See, e.g., In re Zschach, 665 N.E.2d at 1076 ("strict
construction does not require that we interpret statutes in such a manner that would mandate
an unjust or unreasonable result," especially one contrary to the best interest of the child).
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that is incongruent with the realities of modem-day families. 93 Fourth, the key terms
at issue - "parent" in Lawson and "spouse" in In re Jane Doe - are not defined in the
statutes or by judicial precedent to encompass the parties before the courts.
Absent express statutory definitions or common meaning of words that offer
clarity when a statute is applied to a situation not contemplated by the legislature, the
intent of the legislature is the guiding principle in statutory interpretation and
application. This principle was clearly effectuated by the unanimous Supreme Court
of Ohio's decision in Lawson to equate the plaintiff - a de facto parent - with a
legally recognized parent based on the classical parental role he played during the
child's lifetime. The same principle was entirely and inappropriately abandoned by
the courts in In re Jane Doe, despite Trish and Marcia's long-standing relationship
and continued commitment as Jane's parents. Surely, legal recognition of a child-
parent relationship in cases like Jane's, where the parties will receive a lifetime of
peace of mind and emotional and financial security through this recognition, is at
least of equal value to legal recognition of a child-parent relationship upon the death
of a child for the purpose of providing monetary compensation (albeit totally
inadequate) for the parent's loss.
D. Declaring a Live Issue Moot
As noted previously, the parents presented an alternative, independent argument
to the probate and appeals courts: Jane's best interests could be furthered, and
adoption laws fully satisfied, if Marcia voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to
Jane and then immediately re-established that child-parent relationship through the
adoption of Jane by both Marcia and Trish. Both courts held that this issue was moot
in light of their decisions that the stepparent provision of R.C. § 3105.15(A)(1)
prohibited Trish from adopting without automatically terminating Marcia's legal
relationship. Both courts were wrong in declaring this issue moot.
"Unless an assignment of error is made moot by a ruling on another assignment
of error," an Ohio appeals court must "decide each assignment of error and give
reasons in writing for its decision."' 94 Clearly, a court has no duty to fully address an
assignment of error when it is rendered moot by the court's previous discussion or
where some other intervening factor has negated the issue.'95 "Actions become moot
when resolution of the issues presented is purely academic and will have no practical
effect on the legal relations between the parties."' 96
The parents' second assignment of error was not "purely academic," as it would
create new legal relationships among the parties in this case. Marcia's status as
Jane's biological mother would terminate, but be immediately replaced with the
child-parent relationship between Jane and her "new ' parents, Marcia and Tricia.
193 As recently recognized by the United States Supreme Court, "[t]he demographic
changes in the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American family." Troxel
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). See also JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY:
RETHINK!NG FAMILY VALUES IN THE POSTMODERN AGE (1996).
194O1Uo APP. R. 12(A)(I)(c).
195See, eg., Miner v. Witt, 92 N.E. 21 (Ohio 1910).
196Wagner v. Cleveland, 574 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); see also Turner v.
Cleveland School District, 651 N.E.2d 511 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
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Stated differently, the effect of the Ohio step-parent provision that the courts below
cited as determinative of this case - that is, the termination of Marcia's parental
rights if Trish adopts Jane-is rendered wholly inapplicable if Marcia voluntarily
terminates her rights. This presents an entirely different scenario where Jane, for one
brief moment, has no legal parents. Thus, the re-adoption by Marcia and Trish
would not trigger the step-parent provision.97
V. CONCLUSION
Ohio adoption statutes do not expressly apply to cases like In re Jane Doe, and
the rules of legislative intent, statutory application and construction provide
significant leeway for courts to determine whether such adoptions should be allowed
and the effects of such adoptions. The arguments articulated above demonstrate that
the courts adjudicating In re Jane Doe could have, consistent with sound legal
analysis, and should have, consistent with the best interest of Jane and similarly
situated children, found the adoption of Jane by Trish allowable under Ohio law
without the termination of the biological mother's rights. So why the opposite
result?
The possibility of insidious bias against gay parents cannot be overlooked. Judge
Wise's concurrence reflects fear of starting down that slippery slope -if this type of
adoption is permitted, gay marriages cannot be far behind. But such fears are
unfounded. Allowing Trish to adopt Jane does not change her legal status vis-i-vis
Marcia. The adoption would provide standing for Marcia to seek judicial
intervention if Trish fails to honor her legal obligations to Jane. But such
intervention would be on Jane's behalf and for Jane's benefit, not Marcia's.
Courts resolving custody and visitation cases have almost uniformly rejected
sexual orientation as a reason to deny a parent's access to a child. This trend is due,
in no small part, to the ever-growing and virtually uncontested empirical data
demonstrating that gay and lesbian parents are just as qualified as their heterosexual
counterparts to raise healthy and well-adjusted children. Courts have also
recognized the value of having a legal as well as emotional and psychological bond
to more than one parent. A number of states have interpreted and applied their
adoption laws to accommodate these realities.'98 A few states, including Ohio, have
refused to so do."9 But any state truly motivated to serve the best interests of their
197 The point offered here is simply that the courts should have considered this independent
argument made by the parents. However, pursuing this avenue is not without risks. For
example, when Marcia's rights as biological mother are terminated, Jane has, in the eyes of the
law, no legal parents. This technically renders her a ward of the state, and arguably triggers
additional considerations under Ohio's adoption statutes, such as the requirement of obtaining
a home study and consent to the proposed adoption by the agency charged with Jane's care.
These requirements might all be satisfied before Marcia's rights are terminated, but this would
require significant coordination between Marcia, Trish, the probate court, and any other
official entity that gains standing in the matter when Jane is "parentless."
'
98See M.M.D. & B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837, 859 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of K.M. and
D.M. to Adopt Olivia M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (I11. 1995); In re Adoption of Two Children by
H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 541 (N.J. 1995); Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass.
1993); In re Jacob, 600 N.E.2d 397, 405-06 (N.Y. 1995): Adoptions of B.L.V.D. & E.L.V.B.,
628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993).
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children will reject archaic models of family life and allow second parent adoptions,
as long as it is in the best interest of the children involved to do so.
A New Jersey court expressed the rationale for granting second-parent adoptions
quite eloquently:
This case arises at a time of great change and a time of recognition that,
while the families of the past may have seemed simple formations
repeated with uniformity, the so called 'traditional families' have always
been complex, multifaceted, and idealized. . .. We cannot continue to
pretend that there is one formula or correct pattern that should constitute a
family in order to achieve the supportive, loving environment we believe
children should inhabit. This court finds that the family before it is
providing a secure, stable, and nurturing environment for the child. ....
[The adopting parent] is one of the two cornerstones of this supportive
home, and beyond all other issues it is upon this factor that this court
primarily rules in granting this petition for adoption.2"
This could - and should - have been the concluding paragraph in In re Jane Doe.
199See In re Adoption of Baby Z, 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1998); Georgia G. v. Terry M.,
516 N.W. 2d 678, 684 (Wisc. 1994).
2 oAdoption of a Child by J.M.G., 632 A.2d 550, 554-55 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1993).
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